Robert is ending his summer with lots of sailing. For the last two Wednesdays he has been fortunate enough to crew on Evil Octopus, a J/24, at the Wednesday beer can races at Richmond Yacht Club. The owner of the boat, Robin Van Viliet, of Mill Valley, is kind enough to allow lubbers to participate on her crew. Anyway, curiously enough, last night was the final race of the season and turns out that Evil Octopus won the 20-night season trophy! Lots of hard work organizing by the owner of the boat. And lots of hard work organizing all the events at the fantastically remodeled RYC. Robert could get used to this . . .
Owner and primary crew
It has blinking lights . . .
Quite a crowd
This guy Eric runs it all. Very nicely done.
Definitely some by-gone stuff here. Note the William Randolf Hearst Trophy from 1930’s
Pseudonymous attacks on public companies are followed by stock price declines and sharp reversals. I find these patterns are likely driven by manipulative stock options trading by pseudonymous authors. Among 1,720 pseudonymous attacks on mid- and large-cap firms from 2010-2017, I identify over $20.1 billion of mispricing. Reputation theory suggests these reversals persist because pseudonymity allows manipulators to switch identities without accountability. Using stylometric analysis, I show that pseudonymous authors exploit the perception that they are trustworthy, only to switch identities after losing credibility with the market.
U.S. institutions that are need-blind for U.S. applicants and meet full demonstrated need
A number of U.S. institutions of higher learning offer both need-blind admissions and meet the full demonstrated need for all domestic students. However, these institutions are need-aware when it comes to international student admissions. However, all admitted students will have their demonstrated need met. The following schools fall into this category:
U.S. institutions that are not need-blind for U.S. applicants and meet full demonstrated need
Many reputable US institutions that once championed “need-blind” policies in the past have modified their policies due to rising tuition and financial aid costs, as well as less-than-ideal returns on endowments. This largely affects prestigious institutions with vulnerable resources that do not offer merit-based aid but base their financial aid entirely on need and promise to deliver 100% of financial need (composed mostly of grants). These stated institutions refer to themselves as “need-aware” or “need-sensitive,” policies that somewhat contradict their call to admit and provide education for all qualified candidates regardless of economic status but allow them to fully fund the needs of all accepted students.
For instance, at Macalester College, Mount Holyoke College and Smith College, at least 95% of students are admitted without their financial aid need being a factor (i.e., “need-blind”), but a slim percentage (1%–5%), generally students wait-listed or with borderline qualifications, are reviewed in modest consideration of the college’s projected financial resources. All of these aforementioned colleges grant all admitted students full financial aid packages meeting 100% need. At Wesleyan University, attempted shifts to a “need-aware” admission policy have resulted in protests by the school’s student body.
University of Rochester (meets 95% of need with the exception of students who are in their senior year, for which financial aid is curtailed significantly despite slim changes in family financial situation)
As of 2014, Phillips Academy is the only USA boarding high school that has a clearly stated need-blind admission policy and is committed to meeting the full demonstrated need of its admitted students. St. Andrew’s School ended its policy in 2013. Phillips Exeter Academy was “effectively need-blind” prior to the 2009 admission season but stopped the practice because of the economic pressures. Roxbury Latin School, a day school outside of Boston, is also need-blind.
Robert likes this. Well, at least the first 8 pages, before the math starts.
The Limits of Meritocracy
John Morgan, Justin Tumlinsony. Felix Várdyz
We show that too much meritocracy, modeled as accuracy of performance ranking
in contests, can be a bad thing: in contests with homogeneous agents, it reduces
output and is Pareto inefficient. In contests with sufficiently heterogeneous agents,
discouragement and complacency effects further reduce the benefits of meritocracy.
Perfect meritocracy may be optimal only for intermediate levels of heterogeneity.
Robert thinks of his experience with high school swim team. Very unenjoyable because it was clear that of the 8 standing on the starting blocks, one was almost certainly going to win. Maybe a second guy had a small chance. But nobody in the other 6 blocks had a chance. So why try?